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of Maryland enjoyed absolute immunity 
when vetoing or approving legislation. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
began its analysis by noting that it was 
undisputed that some degree of public 
official immunity applied to the gover-
nor when performing gubernatorial 
duties involving the exercise of discre-
tion. Mandel, 320 Md. at 107,576 A.2d 
at 768. The question before the court 
was whether such immunity was abso-
lute or qualified. An absolute immunity 
from tort liability, the court stated, 
"stands even if the official acts in bad 
faith, or with malice or corrupt motives, 
and protects both judges and legislators, 
so long as their acts are 'judicial' or legis-
lative in nature." Id. (quoting Prosser & 
Keeton, ]be Law of Torts, § 132, at 1056-
57 (5th ed. 1984)). Governor Mandel 
argued that his veto/approval function 
was a legislative one, and therefore 
should be protected to the same extent 
as legislators. 
Due to the lack of Maryland prece-
dence regarding gubernatorial immu-
nity specifically, the court based its 
analysis on cases dealing with 42 US.C. 
§1983, a statute which the court be-
lieved to be the driving force in the 
development of public official immu-
nity. Section 1983 allows suits against 
public officials who have caused the 
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws ... " 42 US.C. §1983 (1982). 
The cases, as noted by the court of 
appeals, took a "functional" approach to 
immunity law in that '" [t ]he scope of 
immunity is determined by function, not 
office.'" Mandel at 120, 576A.2d at 774 
(quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 us. 
731,785 (1982) (White,].,dissenting)). 
The court of appeals found that when 
applied to cases dealing with executive 
immunity, the functional approach pro-
duced disparate results. In Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, for example, the Supreme Court 
suggested that a governor would enjoy 
qualified immunity for his deployment 
of National Guard units. The Court anal-
ogized such action to possible arrest 
situations confronted by police officers 
whose actions are subject to good faith. 
Mandel at 117, 576 A.2d at 772 (citing 
Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974)). 
In contrast, the Court found in Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 US. 420 (1976) that a 
state prosecutor's function of initiating 
and presenting a case was covered by 
absolute immunity since the discretion 
involved was similar to that of a judge. 
"Thus, '[a]lthough a qualified immunity 
from damages liability should be the 
general rule for executive officials[,] ... 
there are some officials whose special 
functions require a full exemption from 
liabililty.'" Mandel, at 120, 576 A.2d at 
774 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 
US. 478,508 (1978)). 
When applying the functional ap-
proach to the facts sub judice, the court 
of appeals found that the function of the 
veto, '''as a matter of historical develop-
ment as well as theory[,] ... [was] a 
legislative power.'" Id. at 121-22, 576 
A.2d at 775 (quoting E. Mason, The Veto 
Power, 100 (A Hart. ed. 1967)). As 
such, the exercise of gubernatorial veto 
power requires that it is absolutely 
immune from tort liability. Id. The court 
explained that the act of deliberating on 
the constitutionality, justice, and public 
expediency of legislative measures be-
fore deciding whether or not to exer-
cise veto power was "plainly the func-
tion of a legislator." Mandel at 122, 576 
A.2d at 775 ( quoting People v. Bowmen, 
21 N.Y. 517, 521-22 (1860)). 
In support of its conclusion, the court 
next cited Hernandez v. City of 
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (1982), in 
which the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit squarely held that 
there is absolute legislative immunity 
under §1983, which encompassed the 
executive veto function. Mandel, at 126-
27,576 A.2d at 777-78. In Hernandez, 
the court of appeals stated that '''[t]he 
mayor's veto, like the veto of the Presi-
dent or a state governor, is undeniably a 
part of the legislative process.'" Id. 
(quoting Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 
643 F.2d at 1193-94 (1982)). 
The court rejected the O'Haras' argu-
ment that the governor must be exercis-
ing the state's entire legislative power 
on the subject at issue in order to assert 
absolute immunity. The court did not 
accept such language as a condition 
precedent to absolute immunity, but 
rather found that it could be asserted for 
lesser delegations, such as the power to 
veto. 
By equating the governor's veto power 
to a legislative function, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland specifically noted 
that it was confining its holding to the 
point of intersection of executive and 
legislative powers. Therefore, although 
a Governor of Maryland is an elected 
official, he will nonetheless enjoy abso-
lute immunity when exercising his con-
stitutionally mandated power in a legiS-
lative capacity. 
Mandel represents a Significant broad-
ening of the immunity doctrine in an 
area which had never been considered 
in regard to the highest executive offi-
cial of the state. Specifically, a Governor 
of Maryland enjoys absolute immunity 
when exercising the official function of 
vetoing or approving legislation, regard-
less of the motives that may underlie the 
function. This is in accord with the abso-
lute immunity which the other branches 
of government have long enjoyed. By so 
ruling, the evidentiary problems that 
would arise if a governor were held 
accountable for every veto decision he 
made were avoided. So too was avoided 
the possible separation of powers prob-
lem that may occur if the judiciary was 
empowered with the ability to judge the 
acts of the executive when exercising 
duties which he is constitutionally 
bound to perform. The court's decision 
permits such judgment to remain with 
the governor's constituents, where it 
belongs. 
- Lesley M. Brand 
Taxiera fl. Malkus: AFTER-BORN 
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN HAVE 
A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH 
PATERNITY OF THEIR 
DECEASED PUTATIVE FATHER 
In Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 
578 A.2d 761 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland ruled that an illegit-
imate child born after her alleged father's 
death has the right to establish the 
paternity of her putative father. In so 
holding, the court stated that such an 
interpretation of Maryland's paternity 
statutes conforms with the legislature'S 
intentions of promoting the welfare and 
best interests of children born out of 
wedlock. 
Elaine Taxiera, a Delaware resident, 
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dor-
chester County against Frederick Mal-
kus, the Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Levi Brown, Jr. Id. at 473, 578 
A.2d at 762. She sought a declaration 
under §1-208 of the Estates and Trusts 
Article that Brown was the father of her 
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illegitimate daughter, Leah, who was 
born four months after Brown's death. 
Section 1-208(b) states that a child 
born out of wedlock shall be considered 
to be the child of his father only if the 
father: 
( 1 ) Has been judicially detennined 
to be the father in an action 
brought under the statutes relat-
ing to paternity proceedings; or 
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in 
writing, to be the father; or 
(3) Has openly and notoriously 
recognized the child to be his 
child; or . 
( 4) Has subsequently married the 
mother and has acknowledged 
himself, orally or in writing, to be 
the father. 
Id. ( quoting Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. 
§1-208(b) (1974)). 
While the action was pending, Tax-
ierafiled a "Complaint to Establish Pater-
nity," pursuant to Maryland's paternity 
statutes, asking that Brown be declared 
the father of Leah, and that child support 
be paid by Brown's estate. Id. at 473-74, 
578 A.2d at 762 (citing Md. Fam. Law 
Code Ann. § § 5-1 00 1-48 ( 1984 & Supp. 
1990)). 
The court noted the purpose of the 
paternity statute is "to promote the 
general welfare and best interests of 
children born out of wedlock by secur-
ing for them, as nearly as practicable, the 
same rights to support, care, and educa-
tion as children born in wedlock." Id. 
at 474, 578 A.2d at 762 (quoting Md. 
Fam. Law Code Ann. §5-1002(b)( 1) 
( 1984)). The ensuing sections, which 
are couched in present tense terms of a 
putative father who is alive at the time 
that the paternity action is in process, 
deal with a complaint against the puta-
tive father of an illegitimate child. Spe-
cifically, §5-1043 states that if a father 
dies after he is judicially declared to be 
the child's father, or after he is ordered 
to make support payments, the court 
may summon the personal representa-
tive of the deceased father and order 
child support to be paid from the estate. 
/Id. at 475, 578 A.2d at 762 (emphasis 
added). Thus, under a literal reading of 
the statute, it would appear that a court 
could not order child support to be paid 
from the estate of a father who, like 
Brown in this case, died before any of 
these two events occurs. 
Malkus moved to dismiss the pater-
nity complaint on the grounds that the 
statute did not apply unless there had 
been a judicial detennination of parent-
age before the putative father died. Id. at 
475, 578A.2d at 763 (emphasis added). 
In the alternative, Malkus contended 
that the right to child support tenni-
nated with the death of Brown. Id. Tax-
iera, however, argued that Leah would 
be denied the equal protection of the 
law if § 5-104 3 were interpreted so as to 
prevent her from establishing Brown's 
paternity after his death. Id. 
Taxiera's declaratory judgment action 
was stayed pending detennination of 
thepaternityaction.ld. at 476, 578A.2d 
at 763. The trial court then dismissed 
Taxiera's complaint and held that the 
paternity statute "becomes relevant only 
after ... the court has already declared 
the putative father to be the father ... or 
the court has ordered the father to make 
child support payments." Id. at 476-77, 
578A.2d at 763-64. Thus, because these 
events had not occurred, the court held 
that the action could not proceed under 
§5-1043.Id. at 477, 578 A.2d at 764. 
The court also considered Taxiera's 
argument that the "Survival of Actions" 
statute, §6-401(c) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article, pennitted 
the action to continue in spite of Brown's 
death. Believing that the only remedy 
provided by the paternity statute was an 
award of child support, the court held 
that it did not have the power to require 
the payment of child support by a de-
ceased father's estate. Id. 
Taxiera appealed to the court of spe-
cial appeals but prior to argument, the 
court of appeals granted certiorari to 
consider the Significant issue of public 
importance presented by the c~e. Id. at 
478, 578 A.2d at 764. 
First, the court of appeals explained 
that in § 5-1 005 of the paternity statute, a 
court may determine the legitimacy of a 
child pursuant to § 1-208 of the Estates 
and Trusts Article. If it is judicially 
determined under §1-208 that Brown 
was Leah's father, Leah would be con-
sidered his child and lineal descendant 
under the relevant paternity statutes. I d. 
at 479, 578 A.2d at 764-65. Thus, the 
court focused on §5-1002, which ex-
plicitly set forth the duty of the state "to 
improve the deprived social and eco-
nomic status of children born out of 
wedlock," to determine if Leah was legit-
imate.ld. at 479, 578A.2d at 765 (quot-
ingMd. Fam. Law Code Ann. §5-1002( 1) 
(1984)). 
After citing various Maryland cases 
holding § 1-208(b) to be a legitimation 
statute, the court stated that "the trend 
of the courts throughout the country is 
to give liberal interpretation to legitima-
tion statutes or legislation which seeks 
to achieve that purpose (the modem 
legislative policy of mitigating the impact 
of illegitimacy)." Id. at 479-80, 578A.2d 
at 765 (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 
Md. 536,542, 283 A.2d 777 (1971)). 
Thus, the court held that the provisions 
of §1-208(b) do not exclude a pos-
thumous illegitimate child from in-
heriting from the father. Id. at 480, 578 
A.2d at 765. Although a course of action 
under § 1-208(b) was not available to 
Taxiera, plaintiffs, including after-born 
illegitimate children, who fulfill the re-
quirements of the statute could receive 
its benefits_ Id. at 479 n.5, 578 A.2d at 
764 n.5. 
Malkus, however, contended that the 
paternity statute did not expressly auth-
orize an action against a deceased puta-
tive father's personal representative. Id. 
at 480, 578 A.2d at 765. He argued that 
because the statute referred to the puta-
tive father in the present tense as a 
defendant, and because of the various 
provisions of the statute including the 
giving of notice to the defendant, there 
was a legislative intent that the law only 
apply to living putative fathers. Id. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, Malkus 
argued that §1-208(b)( 1) of the Estates 
and Trusts Article was applicable only to 
putative fathers who were alive at the 
time the paternity complaint was filed. 
Id. 
The court, however, stated that 
"[w]hile the language of the statute is 
the primary source for detennining legis-
lative intent, the plain meaning rule is 
not absolute." Id. Rather, the language 
must be construed with regard to the 
statute's purpose, aim or policies. Id_ 
Moreover, the court recognized that the 
most harmonious construction of related 
statutes, such as the ones at issue, is one 
which gives full effect to both statutes. 
Id. at 481, 578 A.2d at 765. 
Consequently, the court concluded 
that the legislative scheme, encompass-
ing a consistent reading of § 1-208 of the 
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Estates and Trusts Article and the pater-
nity statutes, was intended to provide a 
mechanism to assure that children born 
out of wedlock after their putative 
father's death may obtain a judicial de-
termination of their paternity for pur-
poses of establishing inheritance and 
other rights. [d. at 481,578 A.2d at 766. 
Thus, the court concluded that the cir-
cuit court was empowered under the 
paternity statute to declare whether 
Brown was the father of Leah, despite 
the fact that he had died before the 
paternity action was filed and without 
regard to whether an award of child 
support could be made against his estate. 
Id. at 482, 578 A.2d at 766. Conse-
quently, the court reversed the circuit 
court's judgment and remanded the 
case with directions to conduct further 
proceedings to determine, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, whether 
Brown was Leah's father. Id. 
Thus, the court significantly expanded 
Maryland's paternity laws, as children 
born out of wedlock may now obtain a 
declaration of paternity even if the 
alleged father's death occurred prior to 
the petition. While the number of fraud-
ulent paternity claims may increase, this 
concern, as the court noted, does not 
outweigh the legitimate purpose of pro-
moting the general welfare and best 
interests of illegitimate children through 
their right to establish paternity. 
- Steven Vinick 
Jones v. Speed: EACH APPOINT-
ME NT AT WHICH A PHYSICIAN 
NEGUGENTLY FAILS TO 
CORRECTLY DIAGNOSE HIS 
PATIENT MAY CONSTITUTE A 
SEPARATE NEGUGENT ACT 
UNDER MARYLAND'S MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF 
UMITATIONS. 
In the recent decision of jones v. 
speed, 320Md. 249, 577 A.2d64 (1990), 
the court of appeals ruled that Mary-
land's five year statute of limitations 
does not prevent a patient from bringing 
a medical malpractice claim against her 
negligent physician in spite of the fact 
that the initial misdiagnosis occurred 
more .than five years before bringing 
suit. 
In July of 1978, Elizabeth Jones con-
sulted Dr. William Speed about her 
severe headaches. Although Mrs. Jones 
expressed concern that the headaches 
may have been caused by an intracranial 
abnormality, the doctor did not perform 
a Computerized Axial Tomography 
study ( CAT scan) or other diagnostic 
studies. Mrs. Jones continued to see Dr. 
Speed until September 16, 1985. During 
this period she made sixteen visits to the 
doctor, but Dr. Speed never ordered 
diagnostic studies of any kind despite 
her persistent headaches. On February 
13, 1986 she suffered a nocturnal seiz-
ure. A neurologist ordered a CAT scan, 
noted a brain tumor and had it surgically 
removed. Since then, she has been free 
of headaches and related symptoms. On 
July 14, 1986, the Joneses filed suit 
against Dr. Speed for failure to diagnose 
the tumor despite his seven years of 
treatment.ld. at 254, 577 A.2d at 66. 
Mr. and Mrs. Jones first filed their 
claim against Dr. Speed with the Health 
Claims Arbitration Panel.! d. at 252, 577 
A.2d at 65. Dr. Speed moved for sum-
mary judgment claiming that even if he 
had been negligent in failing to diagnose 
Mrs. Jones' brain tumor, the injury oc-
curred upon the plaintiff's first visit to 
him on July 17, 1978, more than eight 
years before the complaint was filed. As 
such, her claim was barred by section 
5-109(a) of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article of the Maryland Code 
which requires that an action be brought 
within "'[fjive years of the time the 
injury was committed,'" or three years 
from the date which the injury was dis-
covered. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. section 5-109(a)(I), (2) (1989). 
Finding that the injury occurred on 
July 17, 1978, the Chairman of the 
Health Claims Arbitration Panel granted 
the doctor's motion. jones, 320 Md. at 
252,577 A.2d at 65. The Joneses filed a 
notice of rejection of the Chairman's 
order and filed a complaint in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City. Agreeing 
that the claim was barred by the statute 
of limitations, the circuit court also 
granted Dr. Speed's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari before 
the court of special appeals heard the 
case.ld. at 253, 577 A.2d at 65-66. 
In their complaint, the Joneses alleged 
in their first count that Dr. Speed was 
negligent when Mrs. Jones first visited 
him and he failed to order tests which 
would detect her brain tumor. The fol-
lowing counts incorporated the first by 
reference but also stated that similar 
acts of negligence occurred on each of 
Mrs. Jones' subsequent visits. The final 
count was a joint claim for loss of con-
sortium.ld. at 252-53, 577 A.2d at 65. 
According to theJoneses, each time that 
the defendant examined Mrs. Jones and 
failed to order tests which would have 
revealed the tumor, a separate act of 
negligence with its own injury occurred. 
Thus, because many of the appointments 
took place within five years of filing the 
complaint, they constituted negligent 
acts committed within the statute of 
limitations.ld. at 255-56,577 A.2d at 67. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
agreed with the Jones' reasoning and 
held that §5-109(a) did not bar their 
medical malpractice claim by reason of 
the statute of limitations. However, the 
court cautioned that on remand they 
must prove that the defendant commit-
ted a separate act of negligence within 
that five year time frame. Mere proof 
that she continued to suffer because of 
an earlier negligent act would not be 
enough.ld. at 261, 577 A.2d at 70. 
Dr. Speed advanced several attacks 
which failed to undermine the Jones' 
argument. He claimed that accepting 
the plaintiffs' rationale would breath life 
into the "continuous course of treat-
ment rule." [d. at 256, 577 A.2d at 67. 
That rule, the court noted, tolled the 
statute of limitations by delaying the 
accrual date of undiscoverable medical 
malpractice until the termination of 
medical treatment. The rule had been 
explicitly rejected in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). 
Under that rule, Mrs. Jones would not 
have been barred from suing as to her 
first appointment because the treatment 
of her headaches continued to well 
within five years of her bringing her suit. 
However, under the court's decision, 
she was only permitted to bring suit as 
to any negligence committed within five 
years of her complaint, making clear that 
the "continuous course of treatment 
rule" remained dead. jones, 320 Md. at 
256-57, 577 A.2d at 67. 
The court also rejected Dr. Speed's 
assertion that accepting the Jones' the-
orywould "frustrate the legislative intent 
to provide absolute protection to health 
care providers for acts of negligence 
occurring more than five years before 
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